Every VPN dies the same way — a censor blocks the provider's API, clients can't fetch the server list, the app goes dark. Akca Cascade publishes that list on Solana, readable from 100+ RPC endpoints. To kill it, you'd have to kill Solana.
A traditional VPN has one fatal dependency: its API. Block api.provider.com and every client loses the server list. Cascade removes that single point of failure by putting the (encrypted, signed) server list in a Solana account.
The traffic still rides the same WireGuard + AmneziaWG tunnel — Cascade only changes how the server list is distributed. The list is signed so a client can prove it came from Akca and wasn't tampered with, before it connects.
The Cascade config registry is a public Solana account. Pick any RPC endpoint below and read it straight from the chain — your browser talks to Solana directly, not to our servers. You'll see the version, the publishing authority, the integrity hash and the last update slot. (The server list itself is encrypted so a censor can't bulk-harvest it — but its existence, authenticity and freshness are public and verifiable.)
ConfigRegistry · program not yet deployed
| Property | AkcaVPN | Mullvad | Proton | Tor |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| No email / no account | Yes | Yes | No | Yes |
| No-logs (RAM-only) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| DPI obfuscation | AmneziaWG | Partial | Partial | Pluggable |
| Survives an API block | Yes — on-chain | No | No | Bridges |
| Server list independently verifiable | Yes — on Solana | No | No | Consensus |
| Pay anonymously (crypto) | Yes — SOL/USDC | Yes | Limited | Free |
We don't overclaim. Here's exactly where Cascade stands.
Today, Cascade makes discovery censorship-resistant. The roadmap moves authentication and connection on-chain too — so the entire flow survives even a full API block.